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Abstract—Manycore architectures correspond to a main 
evolution of computing systems due to their high processing 
power. Many applications can be executed in parallel which 
provides users with a very efficient technology. Cloud 
computing is one of the many domains where manycore 
architectures will play a major role. Thus, building secure 
manycore architectures is a critical issue. However a trusted 
platform based on manycore architectures is not available yet. 
In this paper we discuss the main challenges and some possible 
solutions to enhance manycore architectures with 
cryptoprocessor. 
Keywords—manycore architectures, symmetric cryptography, 
key exchange, cryptoprocessor 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Secure handling of personal data and privacy in manycore 
architectures is a major issue. The economic and social 
challenges are numerous as this type of architecture will be 
massively deployed in the future both in infrastructure such 
as "cloud computing" and in most embedded systems 
constrained in resources and performance. It is thus essential 
to address the question of the definition of these 
architectures in terms of not only performance but also 
security to ensure a large adoption of these technologies by 
end users. Lack of trust will be a hindrance to economic 
development, the challenges are immense. 
To propose an efficient and secure solution it is necessary to 
enhance hardware manycore architectures with closely 
coupling of heterogeneous processing resources (some 
dedicated to the processing of data in clear and some 
dedicated for treatment of protected data). It is also 
necessary to rethink the relationship between software and 
hardware to ensure a protection in depth. Today these issues 
are too often neglected resulting in solutions developed at 
the end of the design cycle as an afterthought. It is essential 
to provide a breakthrough in these design approaches to 
provide trusted manycore architectures by building 
hardware and software. 
This paper proposes an analysis of trust building to execute 
independent applications in parallel, securely and ensuring 
respect for the privacy of users. For this, several points are 
discussed: 1) proposition of a processing cluster to run both 
algorithms for processing information and cryptographic 
algorithms (with a strong level of coupling for performance 
reasons while ensuring no leakage of information), and 2) 
proposition of a manycore architecture integrating 
heterogeneous clusters for secure cryptographic. One key 
point discussed in this paper is related to the use of several 
cryptoprocessors for a single application. This point needs a 
deep analysis, especially for key exchange in order to 
guarantee no leakage of information. 
The paper is organized as following. Section II discusses 
some challenges to enhance manycore architectures with 
cryptoprocessors. Section III illustrates how these 
challenges can be handled using an existing manycore 
solution named TSAR. Section IV provides an analysis of 
points that still need to be addressed and Section V 
concludes the paper. 
II. CHALLENGES TO ENHANCE MANYCORE 
ARCHITECTURES WITH CRYPTOPROCESSORS 
Manycore based systems will become the mainstream in a 
near future, it is thus mandatory to think these architectures 
with security properties by construction. Cloud computing is 
one of the numerous application domains that will rely on 
this technology. Several applications can be envisioned, for 
example secure access to private information. End users will 
perform many requests in parallel in order to retrieve, to 
search for, and to classify some personal data (e.g. text, 
images, and video). It is thus necessary to combine both 
processing power and cryptographic functions. In order to 
build a solution to execute many independent applications in 
parallel in a secure way, several points need to be targeted: 
1) building of a processing cluster enhanced with 
cryptographic resources, 2) building of a manycore 
architecture integrating heterogeneous clusters for secure 
cryptographic, 3) building of mechanisms for logical 
isolation (in software) and physical (hardware level) to 
ensure execution of partitioned applications, 4) joint 
building of software layers (driver, API ...) and hardware to 
provide a chain of trust and 5) proposition of strategies for 
dynamically distributing applications on a manycore 
architecture taking into account the security needs. All these 
contributions need to be addressed to build an efficient and 
trusted execution platform. In this paper points 1) and 2) are 
discussed.  
Using cryptoprocessors inside manycore architectures raises 
many challenges related to software and hardware layers. 
Links with the operating system and architecture of 
cryptoprocessors correspond to key issues. In this section 
some of these challenges such as heterogeneous clusters 
building, Trusted Computing Base analysis, and parallelism 
exploitation to improve the computation of cryptographic 
algorithms and the key exchange between cryptoprocessors 
are discussed. 
A. Heterogeneous clusters building 
The idea of enhancing GPPs using some coprocessor 
exclusively dedicated to perform some tasks that require 
intensive computation, such as numeric calculus or 
cryptography is not new. The use of heterogeneous clusters 
has been widely studied using for example Graphics 
Processing Units (GPUs) to perform intensive computations 
and thus reducing the GPP workload [4].  
Security is a very important service that a cluster in 
manycore architecture should hold. However cryptographic 
algorithms are based on operations that are generally not 
efficiently computed in GPPs such as bitwise operations, 
modular arithmetic, Galois field arithmetic, etc. [1]. So 
adding cryptoprocessor within a cluster will improve the 
performance of the cluster. Indeed, cryptographic algorithms 
implemented in software take thousands of clock cycles [2], 
while using a dedicated hardware coprocessor reduces the 
execution time to just few tens of clock cycles [3]. So if the 
GPP delegates the cryptographic computations to the 
cryptoprocessor, its workload is significantly decreased. The 
saved time can be used to perform other tasks as image or 
signal computation.  
The goal of the cryptoprocessor is to perform all 
cryptographic computations and to provide a secure 
generation, management and storage for session keys. When 
the amount of data to be processed by the cryptoprocessor is 
significantly large, several cryptoprocessors can be used in 
parallel to accelerate the process. Indeed several execution 
contexts can be considered. 1) An application requires a 
single cryptoprocessor. In that case the application will 
delegate the cryptographic computation to the 
cryptoprocessor. The key generation will be performed by 
the cryptoprocessor itself and no leakage of the key can 
occur. 2) An application requires several cryptoprocessors to 
handle a large amount of data while respecting a required 
bandwidth. In that case, data will be split into several sets 
and each set will be delegated to one cryptoprocessor. In 
that case the key management step is more complex as all 
cryptoprocessors need to share the same session key. A 
dedicated key exchange protocol within the architecture 
needs to be built. Key leakage needs to be considered with 
lot of care. 3) Several applications require a single 
cryptoprocessor. That case is similar to case 1) when 
preemption is not authorized. Such an assumption is 
relevant in order to guarantee a high level of security. In this 
work we discuss a solution in order to address these possible 
execution contexts. Symmetric key primitives are 
considered as they generally correspond to the main 
bottleneck when dealing with high amount of data, they are 
also cheaper in terms of hardware resources. It leads to a 
better tradeoff in terms of additional cost and achieved 
performances. 
B. Cryptoprocessor as a Trusted Computing Base 
The cryptoprocessor should provide algorithms for data 
privacy, data authentication, and hashing, furthermore a 
secure way to generate and store session keys is mandatory. 
Data privacy (i.e. confidentiality) guarantees the information 
can be understood only by authorized users, IV based 
encryption schemes are used to achieve this goal. NIST 
recommends Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cipher Block 
Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback 
(OFB), and Counter (CTR) [7]. In the context of symmetric 
key, data authentication means data integrity, i.e. it 
guarantees that the information has not been modified. 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) correspond to the 
suitable cryptographic primitives to achieve this goal. In the 
literature there are several MAC schemes; interested readers 
can find a survey about them in [6]. In the context of 
manycore clusters, algorithms that provide a wide range of 
parallelism and high efficiency are expected. A selection of 
possible algorithms will be discussed latter in the paper.  
Session keys should be generated using some of the existing 
True Random Number Generator [8]. The storage of session 
keys is performed inside the cryptoprocessor in a trust 
memory zone. As a security requirement when a key has to 
be transmitted outside the cryptoprocessor, the key is first 
encrypted and then sent to the GPP. The GPP has only access 
to encrypted keys in order to avoid software attacks like 
cache attacks [9]. To prevent some side-channel attacks, 
decryption primitive of block cipher should be used only to 
ensure the security of session keys. Other cryptographic 
services must only rely on the encryption primitive. Inside 
the cryptoprocessor an Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) is 
required. It performs the basic operations needed to compute 
mode of operations like bitwise XOR, increment, 
accumulators, etc. 
From the system point of view the cryptoprocessor must be 
separated both at the architectural level and at the physical 
level from the GPP following the guidelines given in [10] 
which allow building a secure system by design.  
C. Notations 
The next sections present the cryptographic parallel 
computation and the key exchange protocol. To describe 
these solutions, the following notation is considered: A block 
cipher is denoted as )( ⋅
K
E  and n is its block length, the n-bit 
strings will be considered as members of )2(
n
GF  or as 
polynomials of degree at most n-1. The addition in this field 
is a bit-wise ⊕ . + denotes an integer addition modulo n2 . 
A||B denotes the concatenation of A and B and |A| is the 
length in bits of A.  Xtimes means the multiplication of 
polynomial )(xq  by monomial x  modulo an irreducible 
polynomial )(xp and denoted as xL . In terms of values 
LxL 2= , LLx 22 = ,…, LLx mm 2=  this operation can be 
computed very efficiently using only one shift register and 
some XORs. 
D. Performing cryptographic operations in parallel 
When the amount of data is large, for example when 
encrypting an image or authenticating a video, more than one 
cryptoprocessor can be used in parallel to reduce the 
computation time. Some existing cryptographic algorithms 
allow their implementation in parallel. For encryption, 
Counter mode is easy to parallelize, it is defined as follows:  
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where IV is an initialization vector, 
m
PP ,...,
1
 the plaintext 
and 
m
CC ,...,
1
 the ciphertext. We can see from the definition 
that each invocation of )( ⋅
K
E  is totally independent from the 
previous, so that a message can be split into parts and each 
part can be sent to different cryptoprocessors along with the 
correct increment of the IV. For MAC the parallelization 
process is more complicated. As a first study Parallelizable 
Message Authentication Code (PMAC1) [11] is considered 
in this work, it is shown in Fig. 1: 
 
Fig. 1. PMAC1 for complete blocks, )0(
n
K
xEL = , 3=β if 
m
P  is a 
complete block otherwise 5=β . 
Same as counter mode, in PMAC1 each invocation to )( ⋅
K
E  
is independent, but in the masking sequence LxLxxL
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each value is dependent from the previous, so the way to 
parallelized it is interleaving the blocks between the different 
cryptoprocessors. For example using two cryptoprocessors, 
one of them processes the odd blocks with the masking 
,...,,
53
xLxxL  and the other one the even blocks with the 
masking ,...,,
642
xLxLx .Each cryptoprocessor computes the 
intermediate addition and finally any of them computes the 
final tag τ . The same principle can be considered when 
more than two cryptoprocessors are available. In the Table 1 
we show the computational cost of PMAC and counter 
mode. 
 
When cryptoprocessors are used in parallel to perform some 
operation, all of them must use the same key, so a protocol 
for key exchange is necessary; this point is addressed in the 
following subsection. 
E. Key exchange between cryptoprocessors  
To perform parallel computation using several 
cryptoprocessors, all of them must handle the data using the 
same key. The output of the cryptoprocessors (i.e. cleartext 
or ciphertext) should be the same independently of the 
number of cryptoprocessors used to perform the 
computation. Indeed depending of the load of the system, 
encryption (or decryption) may be performed using n 
cryptoprocessors while decryption (or encryption) may use 
m cryptoprocessors. This point is defined at runtime based 
on the number of applications running in parallel on the 
manycore architecture. Keys can be shared using 
asymmetric cryptography but the cost in hardware of 
implementing such cryptography is huge in comparison with 
symmetric key primitive. The disadvantage of symmetric 
key based protocols is that they need to preload some master 
keys in each cryptoprocessor, but they can be implemented 
using just a MAC and a TRNG. 
In order to allow an efficient key exchange between 
cryptoprocessors we propose a three levels hierarchical 
organization of the keys. The first level is the master key 
provided from the initialization of the system, the second 
level is the session keys generated by the cryptoprocessor at 
runtime and finally the third level is a pair of keys used to 
share and generate session keys for collaborative work 
between a set of cryptoprocessors. The mentioned 
organization allows the isolation of cryptoprocessors into 
sets and the authentication of the elements of the sets. A 
protocol to share a session key based on Location-Based 
Pairwise Key Establishments for Static Sensor networks [1] 
can be used. First, all the elements of the set of the 
cryptoprocessors are preloaded with a group master key 
G
K  
and set key generation key
K
K , and a unique identifier ID. 
TABLE 1 COMPUTATIONAL COST OF PMAC 
AND COUNTER MODE  
Cryptographic mode BC* per 
block 
XOR 
per 
block 
Extra 
BC 
Extra 
XOR 
PMAC 1 1 0 0 
Counter Mode 1 2 2 1 
*BC is for block cipher calls 
The pairwise protocol between cryptoprocessor A and 
cryptoprocessor B is performed as follows: 
1. A generates a nonce 
A
N and sends it to B 
)],,(,,,[Re
AGKA
NAHelloMACNAquest . 
2. B responds )],,,,(,,,,[
BAGKB
NNABACKMACNABACK . 
3. A can verify that B is a valid member of the group 
computing ),,,,(
BA
G
K
NNBAACKMAC  and comparing 
with the value received from B. 
4. The pairwise key is computed as ),(
BAKK
NNMAC . 
Using this process the pairwise communication keys 
between cryptoprocessors are established, after this any 
cryptoprocessor can generate a session key and share it with 
other cryptoprocessors to perform cryptographic 
computation in a collaborative way. 
If there is a secure channel between cryptoprocessors in a 
set, any of them can generate a session key using the TRNG 
and sends it to the other elements of the set using such a 
channel. The main drawback with this approach is the 
architectural implication of dedicating an exclusive channel 
for cryptoprocessors and its isolation from the other 
communication resources. 
Just some operations are necessary to perform the agreement 
of a key between to cryptoprocessors. Only one call to 
TRNG to generate a nonce and three executions of 
underlying MAC are required: one to prepare the request, 
another one for authentication and the last one to generate 
the pairwise key. The computational cost of a MAC is 
measured according to the number of blocks. A possible 
scenario is to consider that ACK and Hello are 16-bit fixed 
values, the identifiers of each cryptoprocessor A and B are 
32-bit values (enough 2
32
 different identifiers) and finally 
nonces NA and NB are 128-bit strings. If PMAC is used as 
the underlying MAC implemented with a 128-bit-block 
cipher like AES, the |HELLO||A||NA|=176 bits means a two-
block input to PMAC plus two additional block ciphers calls 
(see Table 1). The total cost of the MAC computation for 
request is four block ciphers calls. Following the same 
analysis, Table 2 shows the computational cost for all 
MACs involved in pairwise key agreement. If the amount of 
data to be processed is large, the cost of key agreement 
between a group of cryptoprocessors is negligible. 
The key agreement is done only the first time that two 
cryptoprocessors collaborate for some task, after that the 
corresponding pairwise key is stored in a trust zone in each 
cryptoprocessor correctly indexed for its future use. The 
amount of storage is exactly one key for each 
cryptoprocessor in the group, and initially it is necessary to 
preload three keys in each cryptoprocessor: master key KM, 
group key KG and generation key KK. 
Some of the existing MAC algorithms based on block 
ciphers are parallelizable but not at the level required to be 
easily computed in a cluster, so some work still needs to be 
done to explore new constructions of MACs and 
Authenticated Encryption modes with a wide level of 
parallelization and efficiency.  
III. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE TSUNAMY PROJECT 
The TSUNAMY project [12] explores some solutions to 
address main issues presented in Section II. The following 
section illustrates some of these solutions. 
A. TSAR manycore originale architecture and 
enhancement 
The TSUNAMY project relies on the TSAR manycore 
architecture [13]. The TSAR architecture is based on 
clusters connected through a NoC. Each cluster contains 
some GPPs, some memories and peripherals.  
Fig. 2. Enhanced TSAR architecture 
Fig.2 illustrates the TSAR architecture extended with a 
cryptoprocessor in each cluster. The cryptoprocessor is 
connected to the local interconnect and is reachable as any 
peripheral. DMA is used to send and retrieve data to/from 
the cryptoprocessor. This scheme allows reducing the load 
of CPUs. The cryptoprocessor used in this extended 
architecture is based on the HCrypt solution [10]. 
Cryptoprocessor has configuration registers and its own 
DMA controller. When the GPP wants to use the 
cryptoprocessor first it has to send commands to 
configuration registers to indicate the task to be performed 
by the cryptoprocessor, the initial memory address and the 
size of the data buffer for the DMA, the initial memory 
address where the cryptoprocessors will write the result of 
TABLE 2 COMPUTATIONAL COSTS OF MACS 
USED TO AGREE A PAIRWISE KEY 
Operations involved in 
pairwise key agreement 
Input-
length 
Block  
cipher 
calls 
XOR 
MACKG(Hello, A, NA) 176-bit 4 5 
MACKG(ACK, B, A, NA, NB) 304-bit 5 7 
MACKG(NA, NB) 256-bit 4 5 
Total for the petitioner  13 17 
Total for the responder  14 19 
 
its computation, also establish initial values if necessary. 
After all the configurations are ready, GPP sends and starts 
command to the cryptoprocessor. When the cryptoprocessor 
ends the task it sends a ready message to the GPP. 
The following section presents the HCrypt cryptoprocessor 
used to the enhancement of TSAR. 
B. HCrypt Architecture and implementation 
The HCrypt architecture is shown in Fig. 3. It is divided into 
three security zones: data, cipher and key zones [10]. The 
HCrypt data zone contains 128-bit data registers, 128-bit 
ALU, I/O FIFOs (conversion between 32 bits and 128 bits) 
and the control logic. Configuration data buses (in black) are 
located in the configuration data zone and partly in the 
cipher zone. The HCrypt cipher zone contains two ciphers 
that work independently. Cipher1 is dedicated to key 
protection and Cipher2 to data protection. 
Fig. 3. Architecture of the HCrypt cryptoprocessor. 
Cipher1 uses a master key to decrypt session keys. Random 
numbers generated by the TRNG are transferred directly as 
an encrypted session key which is decrypted on both sides 
using the cipher (Cipher1 in cryptoprocessor). For security 
reasons, Cipher1 cannot be used in CBC-MAC mode for 
authentication of the session key because its output would 
need to be connected to the external data bus (in the data 
zone) and the processor could access the session key in 
clear. Instead, we propose to use a hashing function for 
session key authentication. In this way, the session key 
cannot be read in clear from the session key register. The 
session key is transferred in clear only from Cipher1 to the 
key register and from the Cipher1 to the HASH function 
using the dedicated key memory bus (in gray). The master 
key and session key registers each stores only one key. 
Before encryption, encryption keys (master or session keys) 
are transferred to key inputs of both ciphers via dedicated 
cipher key buses (in white).  
Data are deciphered only by Cipher2 using session keys. The 
cryptoprocessor supports all basic block encryption modes 
except ECB and CBC modes, because deciphering in both 
modes requires a decipher, which is not available in the 
HCrypt. However, data can be authenticated using the CBC-
MAC mode, which requires only the cipher. 
A prototype of HCrypt cryptoprocessor was described in 
VHDL and mapped to Virtex-6 XC6VLX240TFF1156 
device using ISE ver. 12.4. It was implemented and tested in 
the Xilinx ML605 board. The proposed architecture uses 
only fine grain FPGA resources and embedded 
RAMs/FIFOs. HCrypt uses 1618 slices (including two AES 
ciphers, MD5 hash function, TRNG, data path including 
ALU, internal registers and control logic) and 1188 kbits of 
embedded RAM. 
With a clock frequency of 100 MHz, the HCrypt 
cryptoprocessor reached the payload throughput of about 
860 Mbits/s. To estimate this latency, Table 3 provides the 
latency in number of clock cycles for several cryptographic 
operations.  
In Table 3 we can see the number of clock cycles taken by 
HCrypt to perform the counter mode and PMAC. Counter 
mode is very efficient because of the independence between 
the block cipher inputs, and the increment of the counter is 
performed in a dedicated register in the ALU of HCrypt. 
The Xtimes operations for PMAC is also computed inside a 
special register, the initial latency for PMAC is larger than 
in CBC-MAC because of the two extra block cipher calls. 
The extra latency of PMAC is not important when the 
amount of data to be processed is significantly large. In the 
case of key agreement process CBC-MAC could be used 
also in order to save some clock cycles. 
 
The initial version of HCrypt is not designed to work in a 
collaborative way, so an important task of this work is to 
explore the way to use many cryptoprocessors together. We 
will explore the architectural and logical aspects to 
communicate cryptoprocessors in a secure way; this means 
the design of protocols that allow communicating of 
cryptoprocessors without the intervention of GPP. Another 
important task is the definition of the size of the groups of 
cryptoprocessors and the level of cooperation between the 
members, how many cryptoprocessors can be used for the 
same task and the limit of parallelization of the 
cryptographic algorithms.   
TABLE 3 LATENCY OF HCRYPT OPERATION IN 
NUMBER OF CLOCK CYCLES  
Cryptographic operations 
and modes 
HCrypt hardware 
resource 
Number of clock 
cycles 
Session key generation TRNG 1 
128-bit AES ECB Cipher1 11 
256-bit AES ECB Cipher2 22 
MD5 (128-bit input data) Hash 66 
K.128-bit AES CFB Cipher2 14.K+5* 
K.128-bit CBC-MAC Cipher2 13.K+5* 
PMAC Cipher2 26#+13.K 
Counter mode Cipher2 12.K 
 *5 clock cycles for initialization vector, 26 clock cycles for the two extra block 
ciphers calls and extra XOR. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
Building a trusted solution based on manycore architecture 
still requires some work in order to build a trust chain 
between the applications and the architectures. The software 
layer is a critical point where most of attacks are launched. 
It is thus essential to define the software Trusted Computing 
Base. Different solutions can be considered based on an 
operating system or combining an operating system and a 
virtualization layer. One key point is application isolation in 
order to guarantee a secure execution of application and no 
leakage of information (code, data). Some solutions to this 
issue propose to use virtualization mechanism [14], to use 
OS-level separation for multiprocessor system on chip [15], 
or recently to run a trusted agent (TCB element) on every 
core of a many-core platform [16].  
Combining software and hardware isolation needs to be 
considered in order to build a strong security layer being 
able to protect the system against confidentiality, integrity 
and denial of services attacks. It is also essential to 
extensively analyze the threat model in order to anticipate 
the risks when the application or/and the kernel are 
compromised. There have been many researches in that 
domain, it is required to adapt them to the manycore context 
where many applications can run concurrently and compete 
for some resources. Another important concern is how to 
distribute applications on the platform, how to schedule the 
applications and how to build some efficient heuristics 
taking into account processor workloads, execution 
parameters (temperature, frequency, and voltage) and 
security. Introducing security as a new dimension is a major 
concern and still many works needs to be done in that 
direction.  
In the TSUNAMY project we address some of these 
challenges and our goal is to validate these propositions 
through simulation modeling using SystemC CABA. For 
that purpose the TSAR architecture and the ALMOS 
operating system [17] are used. The TSUNAMY project 
aims to provide the scientific community of academic and 
industrial with models of architectures and software libraries 
to efficiently and securely deploy applications on manycore 
architectures. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Manycore architectures correspond to an important 
computation paradigm shift for modern embedded systems. 
The secure execution of applications using these 
architectures still needs to be investigated. In this paper we 
propose to stress some of the challenges that are in front of 
us and we discuss some possible solutions in order to 
enhance these architectures with cryptoprocessors. Key 
agreement in a main step when several cryptoprocessors are 
used in parallel to increase the computation efficiency. We 
propose a first approach to address this point and evaluate 
the performance impact. Some research directions are also 
discussed and conclude the paper. 
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